Abstract-This paper uses decennial Census data to examine the residential integration of the foreign born in the United States between 1910 and 2000. Immigrant segregation declined in the first part of the century, but has been rising over the past few decades. Recent immigrants tend to hail from countries with greater cultural distinctions from U.S. natives, whether economic, racial, or linguistic. These factors explain much of the increase in segregation after 1970. Evidence also points to changes in urban form, particularly native-driven suburbanization and the decline of public transit as a transportation mode, as an explanation for the new immigrant segregation.
I. Introduction
I N recent years, debates over immigration policy have created rifts in many developed nations, and on both sides of the political spectrum. While disagreements over the economic implications of immigration have fueled debates in academic literature and elsewhere (see Borjas, 2003 , Card, 2005 , concerns regarding the cultural impacts of immigration have also been widely raised. One such concern relates to the tendency for immigrants to cluster within their own communities in a matter that some consider to threaten the fabric of civil society. In spite of a long history of immigrant assimilation in the United States, many Americans express concerns that the current generation of foreignborn residents has little interest in joining the mainstream. 1 The notion that residential integration can be used as a proxy for assimilation has a long history in sociological literature (Duncan & Lieberson, 1959) . This paper presents evidence consistent with the view that the rate of immigrant assimilation has slowed in recent decades. 2 Since 1960, the average foreign-born resident of the United States has experienced steadily increasing levels of segregation from the population at large. As figure 1 shows, mean levels of the two classic measures of segregation-dissimilarity and isolation indices-are considerably higher today relative to a generation ago. These general trends toward increasing segregation mask a remarkable degree of variation in the experiences of different ethnic groups and trends in different parts of the country. While segregation has increased for many individual ethnic groups, it has declined for some, and has remained relatively constant for some of the nation's fastest-growing immigrant groups, including Mexicans. Few if any immigrant groups, however, have experienced the wholesale decline in segregation witnessed by African Americans during the same time period (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999) .
Why has immigrant segregation increased even as racial segregation has declined? Are there systematic factors that can explain the disparate experiences of different ethnic groups? If this evidence indicates a failure of immigrants to assimilate, should we attribute that failure to changes in the immigrants themselves or changes in the host society? In this paper, we use variation in segregation over time, across cities, and across ethnic groups to evaluate three theories of immigrant segregation. The first theory asserts that characteristics of immigrants themselves drive variation in segregation. Immigrant groups with weaker attachment to American culture, as measured by objective criteria such as classifications of native languages, or those with stronger ties to their own native culture, should experience more segregation according to this theory.
Two other theories focus on factors that are external to immigrants themselves. The second theory posits that nativism, or other forms of discrimination against immigrants, drives immigrant segregation. Natives either may be willing to pay to avoid immigrants (decentralized discrimination) or may be able to effectively restrict immigrant location choices (centralized discrimination). The third theory focuses on the changing nature of the American city, in particular the rise of car-based living on the urban periphery. Economic segregation increased in the 1970s and 1980s (Jargowsky, 1997) , possibly because of class differences in transportation modes (Glaeser, Kahn, & Rappaport 2001) . Disparities in economic class between immigrants and natives, and their changing implications regarding the importance of accessibility to transportation and employment, may explain some portion of the rise in immigrant segregation.
In section II of this paper, we introduce our data on immigrant segregation in the United States over the twentieth century. Using data from the Census enumerations of 1910, 1920, 1940, 1950, 1970, 1980, 1990 , and 2000, we compute segregation indices for dozens of immigrant groups across hundreds of cities and metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The data reveal that immigrant segregation began the twentieth century at relatively high levels, then declined as federal restrictions and other forces stemmed the tide of immigration after 1920. Over the latter half of the century, as immigrants born in Latin America and Asia began to enter the country in large numbers, segregation rose once again. By one measure, immigrant segregation stabilized during the 1990s, but the isolation of immigrants from the general population continued to increase.
In section III of the paper, we discuss our three theories and describe our methods of distinguishing the relative importance of each. In section IV, we use city and immigrant group characteristics to explain longitudinal variation in segregation levels. We find significant evidence in favor of the cultural difference hypothesis. Immigrants with more experience in the United States and those from countries where the predominant language is more linguistically similar to English tend to be less segregated. Controlling for these factors explains most of the increase in segregation after 1970, but almost none of the increase before that point. We also find evidence supporting the urban form hypothesis: metropolitan areas where public transit is a viable commuting option have witnessed higher increases in segregation over time. Immigrants rely more heavily on transit and other forms of shared transportation relative to observationally similar natives. As the nation has gravitated toward suburban developments and largely abandoned public transit, immigrants have been left behind.
In section V, we follow Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) and look at housing prices to test the various theories of immigrant segregation. We find that immigrants paid a premium for housing in segregated markets as recently as 1970, but that this premium had disappeared by 2000. The most likely explanation for this pattern is that immigrants now tend to occupy neighborhoods that have fallen out of favor with natives. Indeed, in 2000 over 40% of all foreignborn individuals lived in a metropolitan area where immigrant location patterns bore a closer resemblance to the native residential distribution in 1970 than in any subsequent Census enumeration. There is at least some evidence that the presence of immigrants has caused natives to lower their valuation of these neighborhoods (Saiz & Wachter, 2006) . Section VI concludes.
II. Measuring Segregation
There are numerous ways of measuring residential segregation within a population. In this paper, as in our previous work (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor 1999; Glaeser & Vigdor, 2003) , we focus on two measures in particular. The indices of dissimilarity and isolation have many antecedents in the sociological literature (Bell, 1954; Duncan & Duncan, 1955; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1965) , and unlike many other segregation indices they require no information on the geographical location and land area of neighborhood units . These unrestrictive data requirements are advantageous, since we have little information on the geographic arrangement of neighborhoods within a city in the earlier years of our panel.
Each segregation index compares the distribution of members of a group with that of individuals who are not members of that group. In our analysis, a "group" is defined as a set of individuals born in the same foreign country. The unit of analysis is thus a country-of-origin group residing in one specific city or MSA, a construct we refer to as an "immigrant community." The degree of segregation for an immigrant community is essentially the extent to which members of that community tend to live in different neighborhoods than other residents of the same city or MSA who are not members of the community. Note that the roster of residents who are not members of one particular immigrant community includes immigrants from different countries. 3 Our indices are computed using data from the decennial Census; the data identify country of birth for foreign-born individuals using subcity geography in 1910, 1920, 1940, 1950, and 1970 through 2000 . One clear limitation to Census data is that they do not separately identify the children of immigrants from other native-born individuals, except in a handful of cities in 1910 and in 1970. Thus it is possible that some of the variation in immigrant segregation may occur as immigrants "self-integrate" by having nativeborn children. We present an analysis of this concern in the appendix; this analysis concludes that "childbearing bias" is in most cases small in magnitude and leads us to, if anything, understate the magnitude of time series variation in immigrant segregation. 4 The dissimilarity index is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation. It is calculated by dividing a city or metropolitan area into neighborhoods, indexed i, and using the formula in equation (1):
where group i denotes the number of relevant immigrant group members living in neighborhood i, group total denotes the number living in the entire city or metropolitan area, and nongroup i and nongroup total are similarly defined for residents not belonging to the group in question. 5 The dissimilarity index takes on a value of 0 when each neighborhood contains a constant proportion of group members, and a value of 1 when group members never share neighborhoods with nongroup members. Intermediate values can be interpreted as the share of group members that would have to switch neighborhoods in order to achieve an even distribution across the city or metropolitan area.
The isolation index measures the degree of exposure that immigrants have to other members of their group, correcting for the fact that groups forming a larger share of the population have naturally higher exposure rates. We calculate the index with the following formula: (2) where group i and group total are defined as above, population i and population total represent the overall population in tract i and the entire city or metropolitan area, and population smallest is the population of the neighborhood with the fewest residents in the city or metropolitan area. The numerator of this formula is the difference between the neighborhood group share experienced by the "average" group member and the share that would be expected if the group were spread evenly across all neighborhoods. The denominator scales the numerator to have a theoretical range between 0 and 1. An index value of 0 implies that the immigrant group is spread evenly across neighborhoods. A value of 1 occurs when group members are concentrated in neighborhoods where all residents belong to the group.
While the indices of dissimilarity and isolation cover the same theoretical scale, and reach their extrema under the exact same circumstances, there are important differences between the two, discussed at some length in Massey and Denton (1988) and Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) . Most importantly for our purposes here, groups that form only a very small share of the population may exhibit high dissimilarity and low isolation simultaneously, if they reside in a small number of neighborhoods but still form only a small share of the population in those neighborhoods. Our results below confirm that isolation has a stronger positive association with a group's share of the population. 6 4 There are two other potential solutions to the childbearing problem. One would be to compute segregation indices using the residential location of adults only. Another would be to use the household as the unit of analysis, rather than the individual, coding immigrant status according to the nativity of the head. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from pursuing either strategy in years prior to 1990, since the required crosstabulations of country of origin by age by census tract, or of country of origin by relationship to the household head by census tract, are not available in public-use Census data.
5 Segregation indices require us to operationalize the concept of "neighborhood." Our definition of neighborhood is driven largely by data availability. Prior to 1940, the Census Bureau reports population statistics, including a count of the foreign-born population by country of origin, at the city ward level. Wards are political subdivisions of cities that range widely in shape and size across cities. For this reason, some caution is warranted when interpreting segregation indices based on ward data (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999) . Beginning in 1940, we use census tracts as our neighborhood construct. Tracts are designed to be of relatively constant size, each containing roughly 4,000 residents, with boundaries usually determined by large roads, railroad tracks, or natural features.
In almost all cases, tracts are smaller geographical units than wards. For this reason, segregation measured at the ward level tends to be lower than segregation measured at the tract level (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor 1999) . In previous work, using data on black-white segregation in 1940, when both ward and tract data were available for many cities, we determined that the discrepancy between ward-and tract-level segregation was approximately 15 percentage points for both the dissimilarity and isolation indices. While it is unclear whether similar adjustment factors would apply in the case of immigrant segregation, the reader is encouraged to keep this factor in mind while reviewing the results below. 6 Before proceeding with interpretation of these trends, it is important to note three limitations with our time series. First, as noted above, our definition of a neighborhood changes between 1920 and 1940. This complicates any comparison of segregation levels before 1940 with those experienced afterwards. Second, the definition of a city changes over time as well. Beginning in 1970, our data pertain to MSAs rather than to cities. This change may be responsible for some portion of differences in segregation levels between 1950 and 1970. Finally, our segregation data for 1980 are incomplete. To compute segregation indices in 1980 and later years it is necessary to consult Census Summary File 4A. We attempted, unsuccessfully, to acquire a complete version of this file from the Census Bureau. Failing in this attempt, we collected data from a number of different sources for a total of 32 states and the District of Columbia. While the states included in our collection cover the vast majority of the immigrant and native population, we are unable to compute indices for immigrant communities in Connecticut, Colorado, and several other smaller states. Finally, in 2000, the Census Bureau stopped tabulating immigrants by country of origin by tract in public-use data. Our 2000 indices are based on restricted-access Census microdata, the same underlying source used to produce public-use files.
A. Trends in Immigrant Segregation
Our most basic summary information on immigrant segregation in the twentieth century is summarized in table 1 and figure 1. Both the table and figure show weightedaverage segregation levels, with weights equal to the size of an immigrant community. 7 Indices of dissimilarity and isolation followed generally similar paths, falling in the early part of the century, then rising in the latter portion. Isolation began at a relatively elevated level and fell between 1920 and 1950 even as dissimilarity began its rise. 8 Table 1 indicates that this pattern mirrors trends in the overall size of the immigrant population, which also reached a relative minimum in 1950. Depending on the index used, immigrant segregation levels in 2000 either match the highest levels in recorded history (dissimilarity) or stand at levels not seen in seventy years (isolation). 9 Ninety years later, segregation levels experienced by a new cohort of recent immigrants were remarkably similar to those observed in 1910. By the end of the century, the largest immigrant groups in the United States hailed from Latin American and Asian countries. Table 1 shows summary information for the six largest immigrant groups by country of origin: Mexicans, Filipinos, Germans, Vietnamese, Indians, and Chinese. With the exception of the more modestly segregated German group, these immigrant groups experienced average dissimilarity levels between 0.5 and 0.6, remarkably similar to those of the "newer" immigrant groups in 1910. The highest isolation levels, for Mexican and Chinese immigrants, approach the levels of Russian and Italian immigrants in 1910.
These overall trends in segregation mask considerable variation across immigrant groups. Figures 2 through 7 display long-term trends in dissimilarity and isolation levels for three sets of immigrant groups. Not only do the individual groups vary in their long-term experiences, but individual groups' trends vary depending on the segregation index examined. Figures 2 and 4 , which track the 7 We define an immigrant community as a group of at least 1,000 individuals born in the same country residing in the same city. The values shown can thus be interpreted as the segregation experienced by the "average" immigrant in each year. 8 The decline between 1920 and 1940 is especially noteworthy since the transition from wards to tracts should lead to a natural increase in our index. Recall that since our indices focus exclusively on foreign-born immigrants, this time series pattern is evidence of within-generation residential integration. 9 The transition from ward to tract data, and from city to MSA aggregation, imply that caution should be used in the interpretation of differences between early (1910-1920) and later (1970-1990) parts of the century. For example, much of the increase in segregation observed between 1950 and 1970 may reflect the transition from city-based to MSA-based measures. Of course, the fact that such a transition would alter measured segregation is a meaningful observation, a point we return to below. Trends within these time periods are not subject to similar caveats. The relative stability of dissimilarity between 1990 and 2000 in some respects echoes Jargowsky's (2003) findings that economic segregation declined during the 1990s. As we will see later, some of the same forces identified as potential drivers of economic segregation show a relationship with immigrant segregation. dissimilarity of "old" and "new" European immigrant groups, mirror the overall trend toward increasing dissimilarity in the later twentieth century. Isolation, on the other hand, has been decreasing for most of these groups, as seen in figures 3 and 5. As seen in table 1, the older immigrant groups of Northern and Western Europe have historically had lower segregation levels than those of Southern and Eastern Europe; this gap appears to be closing in recent data.
Omissions in Census reporting make it difficult to construct historical time series on the segregation of Asian and Latin American immigrant groups. Figures 6 and 7 summarize the available dissimilarity and isolation indices for these groups. The newest immigrant groups generally experience high levels of segregation. For the groups shown here, however, dissimilarity has been either constant or decreasing in recent years. Isolation, by contrast, has remained steady or risen for each group in each decade since 1970.
Analyzing the graphs as a group, several notable patterns appear. The considerable rise in overall average dissimilarity between 1950 and 1990 is not replicated in the time pattern for any individual group. While dissimilarity increased for many groups between 1950 and 1970, the general picture between 1970 and 1990 is one of stasis or decline for most immigrant groups, particularly the "newest" groups plotted in the last figures. The overall stability in immigrant dissimilarity in the 1990s masks notable increases for many European groups, coupled with stable or declining dissimilarity for the "newest" groups. Similarly, the overall rise in isolation between 1970 and 2000 is not perfectly replicated by any individual group. Overall levels FIGURE 2.-DISSIMILARITY FOR OLDER IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1910 -2000 Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community. FIGURE 3.-ISOLATION FOR OLDER IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1910 -2000 Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community. IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1910 -2000 Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community.
FIGURE 5.-ISOLATION FOR NEW IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1910 -2000 Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community. of immigrant segregation are rising largely because the composition of the immigrant population is shifting toward the more-segregated "newest" groups.
Another intriguing pattern is the tendency for dissimilarity and isolation indices to move in opposite directions over time. In the last half of the century, most European immigrant groups experienced increases in dissimilarity and decreases in isolation simultaneously. That is to say, these groups witnessed an increase in distance between their neighborhoods and those occupied by nongroup members, but within their own neighborhoods their degree of concentration declined. For the newest immigrant groups, those experiencing the most rapid population growth, the pattern is reversed. For these groups, dissimilarity levels are declining or stable, while isolation levels have been increasing. The newest immigrants are appearing in an ever-increasing number of neighborhoods, but those neighborhoods are becoming increasingly concentrated. These observations are consistent with groups experiencing rapid growth, but it should be noted that even for some of these groups rapid growth has brought very little change in segregation levels in the past twenty years.
These clues that dissimilarity and isolation capture distinct phenomena and are influenced by different factors were alluded to above and will be corroborated by further evidence in section V below. In general, isolation displays a strong positive correlation with group size, while dissimilarity does not. Thus it is not surprising that the fastestgrowing groups exhibit increasing isolation but stable or declining dissimilarity.
III. The Causes of Segregation
In this section, we discuss three potential explanations for the rise in immigrant segregation. We will divide our explanations into three broad categories: (i) cultural distance, (ii) discrimination, and (iii) urban form. The first category emphasizes changes within the immigrant community. The second two categories emphasize external changes.
A. Culture and Assimilation
Perhaps the most common theory of immigrant ghettos is that these concentrations occur because immigrants want to live near people with similar tastes and who speak the same language. Because sharing preferences and communication tools is desirable, immigrants will systematically outbid natives for housing in neighborhoods with high same-group concentrations. Immigrants from countries that are more culturally different from the United States should display the greatest tendency to follow this pattern. This theory also predicts that as some assimilation occurs even for those immigrants who live in segregated communities, we should expect to see that immigrants who have lived in the United States longer will live in less segregated communities.
We will focus on whether segregation across groups is related to the degree of cultural distance from the United States and to the length of time that group members have spent in the country. We use two measures of the cultural distance between a country of origin and the United States. First we consider linguistic difference. Using a wellestablished categorization of language families (Comrie, Matthews, & Polinsky, 1996) , we sort immigrant groups into those from English-speaking countries, those from countries speaking other Germanic languages, those from countries speaking Indo-European languages outside the Germanic branch, and those from countries speaking nonIndo-European languages. We also use broad region-oforigin categories to distinguish immigrant groups from more and less developed parts of the world, and from regions geographically closer to or more distant from the United States. This theory suggests that the degree of FIGURE 7.-ISOLATION FOR NEWEST IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1920 -2000 Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community. FIGURE 6.-DISSIMILARITY FOR NEWEST IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1920 -2000 Observations are weighted averages of statistics for immigrant communities, with weights equal to the number of immigrants in the community.
cultural sharing is related to similarity in the degree of economic development, or the degree of physical proximity between countries. We can also test the importance of socioeconomic status at a more micro level by controlling for a measure of the skill content of immigrants' occupations by country of origin, destination city, and year. These proxy measures for cultural distance are admittedly very crude; a failure of these measures to explain variation in immigrant segregation might reflect negatively on the measures themselves rather than the underlying hypothesis. Our prior belief, however, is that the factors listed here are reasonable measures of the cultural attributes that matter for the assimilation process.
The theoretical relationship between segregation and group share is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher concentration in the population may reduce the need for immigrants to cluster in order to take advantage of shared cultural amenities. On the other hand, economies of scale in the provision of these amenities could result in increased returns to clustering when groups form a larger share of the population. Controlling for group share, on the other hand, immigrants in larger cities may exhibit a greater tendency to cluster, since physical distances between members will be greater in larger cities.
A final strategy for testing the culture and assimilation hypothesis will focus on the link between immigrant segregation and the prices that immigrants pay for housing across metropolitan areas. If immigrants place a positive value on living in an enclave community, we should observe that immigrants pay premiums to live in a segregated community. Relatively unassimilated immigrants should place the highest value on exposure to members of their own group; we therefore expect newly arrived immigrants to pay the highest premium for housing.
B. Discrimination
A second theory of rising segregation of immigrants is that these immigrants have become targets of increasingly more virulent nativism. This change may be attributable in part to racial distinctions between natives and the most rapidly growing immigrant groups. There are several natural ways to test this theory. A simple test would examine whether immigrant groups belonging to different racial categories experience significantly higher segregation controlling for other characteristics. It is reasonable to expect that nativism increases in the density of the immigrant population, in which case group share would be a positive predictor of segregation. Finally, following the methodology of Kain and Quigley (1975) and Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) , we can examine the link between segregation and the prices that immigrants pay for housing. If discrimination against immigrants takes on a centralized form, whereby natives impose restrictions on immigrant location choices, we expect immigrants to pay a premium for housing. Unlike the preceding hypothesis, we would expect such a discrimination-related premium to apply to immigrants equally regardless of their degree of assimilation or expectations regarding length of stay in the host country. If discrimination against immigrants is decentralized, we would expect natives to pay a premium for housing in communities with higher degrees of immigrant segregation. As detailed below, native premia for housing in segregated areas is also consistent with the hypothesis that immigrants occupy neighborhoods that have fallen out of favor with natives. To distinguish these explanations, we will test whether immigrant discounts for housing are particularly acute for immigrants who belong to particular racial groups.
C. Urban Form
A final hypothesis is that immigrant segregation is getting worse because of changes in urban form and in particular the rise of low-density suburban residence and employment. Across metropolitan areas in 1940, there were roughly two central-city residents for every one suburban resident-a ratio that had changed very little since the mid-nineteenth century. In 1970, the metropolitan population was evenly divided between central cities and suburbs. By 2000, there were nearly two suburban residents for every central-city resident. This remarkable shift, attributable in part to technological advances, public infrastructure investment, and housing policies, has spawned a voluminous literature in history and the social sciences. 10 Suburbanization could lead to greater immigrant segregation for several reasons. Immigrants might simply have idiosyncratic preferences for dense residential environments, or might attach low values to amenities that are more plentiful in the suburbs. Dense location might also be a matter of necessity rather than choice. In cities where public transit is a feasible commuting alternative, the location decisions of socioeconomically marginalized groups, such as immigrants, may be highly sensitive to proximity to the transit grid, or to proximity to potential carpool-mates. As transit commuting declines in importance for other groups, tendencies toward residential separation will be magnified. In some sense, this hypothesis is an extension of Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (2000) , who show that poverty rates tend to increase in tracts that gain access to fixed rail systems, and that poor households tend to cluster together in auto-dependent cities. Table 2 presents some preliminary evidence on the importance of public transit and other shared transportation resources for immigrants. Using Census microdata from 1970 and 2000, we estimate linear probability models analyzing the propensity to commute using public transit or in 10 See Jackson (1985) for a comprehensive history of suburbanization. a carpool. 11 In both years, immigrants are significantly more likely to use transit or carpool relative to native individuals of similar age, educational attainment, marital status, and race. Comparison of models that include and exclude metropolitan area fixed effects reveals that immigrants gravitate toward cities where a large share of the overall population relies on transit-the foreign-born effect is reduced by two-thirds or more when fixed effects are introduced. It is also interesting to note that the foreign-born effect on transit use has declined over time, as has the use of transit in general. In models incorporating MSA fixed effects, immigrants have gone from 4.3 percentage points more likely to use transit to 1.3 percentage points more likely. At the same time, immigrants' disproportionate reliance on carpools has increased, from a 1 percentage point difference to a 4.6 percentage point difference. Thus, while the modal form of shared transportation resources may have changed over time, from public transit to carpools, the importance of such resources for first-generation immigrants is quite clear.
There are two ways of testing the hypothesis that broad changes in urban form have led to increases in immigrant segregation. First, if the decline of public transit has increased the segregation of groups that rely on it, controls for public transit use should modify the observed segregation time trend. Second, even if differential valuation of urban and suburban amenities is more important than differential use of shared transportation, the formation of immigrant enclaves in neighborhoods undergoing depopulation by natives should lead to a negative association between immigrant segregation and the price immigrants pay for housing.
IV. Direct Evidence on the Determinants of Segregation
To understand the factors underlying the rise of immigrant segregation in the latter part of the twentieth century, we formed a panel data set of segregation indices, where the unit of observation is the country of origin/city of residence/ year. As tables 3A and 3B indicate, the resulting data set has 7,362 observations spanning the years 1910 to 2000. A representative regression equation takes the form
where i indexes country of origin, j indexes city or MSA, and t indexes time. The dependent variable s ijt is a segregation index, either dissimilarity or isolation. This equation incorporates fixed effects for years, immigrant groups, and cities, ␣ t , ␥ i , and ␦ j , respectively; in some specifications these fixed effects may be constrained to equal 0. The vectors X ijt and X jt represent potentially time-varying attributes of the immigrant community and city/MSA, respectively. In some specifications, the vectors of coefficients on these variables, ␤ 1 and ␤ 2 , will be constrained to equal 0. In each table, the specification reported in column 1 includes only year effects as explanatory variables, to redisplay the basic time trends first made evident in figure 1. 12 Table 3A , which focuses on the dissimilarity index, shows discrete jumps in dissimilarity levels between 1920 and 1940, and again between 1950 and 1970 , followed by steady increases through 1990. Average dissimilarity levels were roughly 20 percentage points higher in 2000 than they were in 1910. Some portion of the earlier increases in measured segregation may result from methodological changes put in place between 1920 and 1940 (the switch from ward to tract as a neighborhood unit) and 1950 and 1970 (the switch from 11 Probit specifications yield very similar results.
12 These regressions are weighted by the number of observations used to compute certain immigrant community/year specific characteristics using IPUMS data. This weighting procedure is roughly equivalent to weighting observations by immigrant community size. Thus, the year effects can be interpreted as year-to-year differences in the level of segregation experienced by the typical immigrant. Note: Sample consists of all workers age 14 and up. Additional individual controls include categorical indicators for race, marital status, and educational attainment. Regressions are estimated using linear probability models; results of probit specifications are qualitatively similar. In 1970, the carpool variable identifies only those who report commuting to work as a passenger in a private vehicle. All regression coefficients presented in this table are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.
city to MSA as a unit of aggregation). 13 Our previous research (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999) suggests that the first switch, in particular, should lead to an increase in measures of segregation. Table 3B , however, shows that increased segregation indices are not an inevitable result of these methodological changes. As was evident in figure 1, isolation levels declined for several decades after 1910, only to rise significantly after 1970. According to this regression specification, isolation levels in 2000 were virtually indistinguishable from those in 1910.
Columns 2 through 6 in both tables introduce an increasing number of covariates to the analysis, with the intention of explaining the time patterns of segregation shown in the first column. Column 2 begins the process by introducing city/metropolitan area fixed effects into the analysis. With these effects in place, the year effects measure within-city changes in segregation levels over time. This alteration actually steepens the slope of the dissimilarity time path: in cities where dissimilarity levels were observed in both 1910 and 2000, the 2000 indices are nearly 28 percentage points higher. The gradual shift of immigrants to less segregated parts of the country has partially masked the overall increase in dissimilarity. Isolation, on the other hand, appears to have declined more rapidly within cities between 1910 and 1970; the 1970 to 2000 trend is roughly equivalent within cities and overall. In column 3 of tables 3A and 3B, the city or MSA fixed effects are replaced with country-of-origin fixed effects. For both the dissimilarity and isolation indices, the permanent tendency for some groups to be more segregated than others explains a substantial portion of the overall variation. In later specifications we will try to explain this variation more fully. For the time being, note that these fixed effects reduce 13 Note that increases in segregation attributable to the switch from city to MSA reporting between 1950 and 1970 can be thought of as consistent with the urban form hypothesis. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Regression specifications are weighted according to the sample size used to compute mean group/city/year characteristics used in columns 4-6. Standard errors in column 5 have been corrected for within-ethnic group clustering. **denotes a coefficient significant at the 5% level.
the time trend for both indices considerably. The withinethnic group estimate of the change in dissimilarity between 1910 and 2000 is roughly 25% smaller than the raw estimate. Within ethnic groups, the change in isolation over this time period is negative. Between 1970 and 2000, there is virtually no within-group trend in either dissimilarity or isolation. This is consistent with the graphical evidence presented in figures 2 through 7.
The regressions reported in column 4 revert to city/MSA fixed effects and add a basic set of explanatory variables: the logarithm of city/MSA population, the immigrant group's share of the total population, a measure of the group's average socioeconomic status (SES), and the mean age of immigrant group members in a given city in a given year. 14 The last variable is intended to capture the average duration of immigrants' tenure in the United States, as Census enumerations have not always collected information on immigrants' year of entry. Both dissimilarity and isolation index values tend to be lower for immigrant groups residing in larger cities, though the relationship between population and dissimilarity is not statistically significant. Older immigrant groups also tend to be less segregated by either index measure, consistent with the view that time spent in the United States reduces cultural distance. There is a significant negative link between SES and isolation levels, but no comparable link appears with dissimilarity. Finally, the impact of group share on segregation, holding other factors constant, differs significantly depending on the segregation index used. Groups forming higher shares of the metropolitan population tend to be both more isolated and less dissimilar than other groups. This can be interpreted as a 14 The socioeconomic measure is the Occupation Score, which is a measure of average earnings of workers in a given occupation as of 1950. Other measures such as educational attainment and earnings are not available in Census data from 1910 and 1920. Age is used rather than years since immigration reflects the absence of a year of entry variable in some Census enumerations. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Regression specifications are weighted according to the sample size used to compute mean group/city/year characteristics used in columns 4-6. Standard errors in column 5 have been corrected for within-ethnic group clustering. **denotes a coefficient significant at the 5% level.
tendency for larger groups to spread out into more neighborhoods while still maintaining high concentrations in a few core areas. This pattern reflects basic information conveyed in table 1. Only the largest immigrant groups, such as Mexicans in 2000 or Italians in 1910, experience anything above negligible isolation levels. Dissimilarity, on the other hand, is often higher for relatively small groups, such as Vietnamese immigrants in 2000. 15 As discussed in greater detail below, small groups may need to cluster together at higher rates to take advantage of localized shared resources, including transportation. Larger groups can maintain critical masses in a larger number of neighborhoods.
Recalling the initial purpose of this exercise, it is quite noteworthy that the addition of these four controls, which explain a considerable proportion of the cross-sectional variation in segregation, particularly for the isolation index, do little to explain the time trends in immigrant segregation between 1910 and 2000. In fact, the results suggest that the rise in isolation over this time period would have been more striking if the characteristics of immigrant groups had not changed over time. The addition of these controls does explain some portion of the rise in segregation since 1970. Table 4 shows that relative to the basic MSA fixed effect model, the basic controls for MSA size, group share, SES, and age explain roughly one-third of the increase in dissimilarity over this time period, and nearly two-thirds of the increase in isolation. In all then, the variables controlled for in column 4 explain very little of the pre-1970 time trends, but a decent portion of the post-1970 trends.
The specifications in column 3 indicated that the changing country-of-origin composition of the immigrant population explains virtually all of the post-1970 increases in segregation. In column 4, we introduce a simpler set of indicators for immigrant groups' country of origin and for the primary language spoken in the origin country, to see if these basic indicators can help us understand why some groups are perpetually more segregated than others. The omitted origin category is European/Canadian, and the omitted language category is English. The results indicate that immigrant groups speaking non-Germanic languages are consistently more segregated from the rest of the population. Immigrants originating in African or Caribbean countries tend to have higher dissimilarity levels; Caribbean immigrants are also more isolated than others. The existence of positive effects for African and Caribbean immigrants suggests that racism, either centralized or decentralized, may play some role in recent increases in immigrant segregation.
The perpetually higher segregation of these groups, which seems easy to relate to cultural distance factors, coupled with their tremendous growth as a share of the immigrant population, explains much of why immigrant segregation is increasing in the aggregate even though few individual groups have. Table 4 shows that the addition of these controls pushes the regression-adjusted increases in segregation toward 0, both in the 1910-2000 and the 1970-2000 periods.
Column 6 reintroduces group fixed effects to the model. We lose the ability to measure region of origin or language effects, but retain city/MSA fixed effects and time-varying characteristics of groups and cities in the model. These regression models fit the data particularly well, with R 2 measures of 0.77 in table 3A and 0.83 in table 3B. Estimated year effects continue to display an increasing, statistically significant pattern. Intriguingly, the time trend of dissimilarity is actually steeper when controlling for group fixed effects than when controlling for group characteristics. The isolation time trend is flattened somewhat.
As Table 4 illustrates, the factors controlled for in tables 3A and 3B can explain some portion of the overall time trends in immigrant segregation during the twentieth century, but leave much to be explained. Using the MSA fixed effect model as a starting point, basic measures of cultural difference, including socioeconomic status, a proxy for years since immigration, linguistic, and region-of-origin effects can explain roughly two-thirds of the increases in dissimilarity and isolation witnessed since 1970. These factors do comparatively little to explain the increases in segregation that occurred before 1970. As mentioned above, methodological changes in our measurement of segregation, most specifically the switch from city-level to MSA-level measures between 1950 and 1970, suggest that changes in urban form explain some portion of the overall trend. If the process of suburbanization has increased separation between immigrants and natives, it makes sense that the increase would be invisible so long as the city is the unit of observation. Table 5 provides more direct evidence on the relationship between changes in urban form and segregation. Specifically, it introduces controls for public transit ridership into the standard regression specifications employed in tables 3A and 3B. Commuting data were collected by the Census Bureau beginning in 1960, thus these models omit city/year observations from before that date. The purpose of introducing these controls is to test the hypothesis that immigrants' reliance on public transportation, documented in table 2, has reduced their contact with natives, as the latter group moved increasingly toward private automobile transportation as a commuting mode. 16 The first regression in table 5 essentially repeats the specification in column 6 of table 3A, incorporating ethnic group fixed effects but omitting metropolitan area fixed effects. 17 Coefficient estimates in the two models are highly similar, with the exception that the logarithm of city population exerts a positive and significant impact here but not in the previous table. This discrepancy reflects the use of cross-sectional variation to identify the impact of population. Abstracting from this, it is important to note the continued significant rise in immigrant segregation between 1970 and 2000.
Introducing a simple control for the logarithm of public transit ridership alters the coefficient estimates in important ways. 18 First, note that the coefficient on the public transit variable is positive and statistically significant. The inclusion of this variable reduces the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the logarithm of city population, as well as two of three year effects. Point estimates suggest that the tendency for immigrant segregation to be higher in cities with a high reliance on public transit explains about one-third of the residual increase in segregation between 1970 and 2000. Point estimates also suggest that higher rates of public transit 16 The share of commuters relying on transportation declined steadily over the latter half of the twentieth century. Between 1990 and 2000, for example, the number of public transit commuters in the United States remained effectively constant, even though the total population grew by 13%. 17 We omit metropolitan fixed effects in this sample because of the shorter panel length. It should be noted, however, that incorporating metropolitan fixed effects in table 4's second and fifth regressions switches the sign on the log(public transit commuters) variable. This result implies that cities where public transit use increases experience declines in immigrant segregation. Such a result could occur if, for example, the marginal users of public transit are natives, and inframarginal users are immigrants. The results in table 5 are thus driven primarily by crosssectional variation in public transit ridership.
18 Since these regressions control for the logarithm of city population, controls for the logarithm of public transit ridership are roughly equivalent to controlling for the logarithm of the public transit ridership rate (controlling for the logarithm of individuals working outside the home in each city would make this statement exact). Controlling for public transit ridership share directly yields positive but insignificant coefficients. This pattern implies a decreasing positive impact of public transit usage on segregation. Such a declining impact is wholly consistent with the conjecture offered in the preceding footnote, that immigrants are among the first groups to adopt transit, with natives forming a more marginal group. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Regression specifications are weighted according to the sample size used to compute mean group/city/year characteristics. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within metropolitan area/year observations. **denotes a coefficient significant at the 5% level, *the 10% level.
use explain about half of the positive association between metropolitan area size and segregation. 19 In relative terms, public transit ridership declined between 1970 and 2000. Thus, the pattern observed in table 5 is somewhat incongruous with a typical omitted variable story. Transit ridership is positively correlated with segregation, but negatively correlated with the year effects, hence it is difficult to understand why the coefficients in the first regression are "too big." The third regression in table 5 sheds light on this pattern, by adding interactions between the transit ridership variable and year effects. These interaction terms reveal that the impact of ridership on segregation increased significantly over time. In 1970, there was essentially no relationship between public transit ridership and segregation. This correlation first appears in 1990 and continues through 2000. As public transit's market share has decreased, it has become more positively associated with segregation. This pattern makes sense if the commuters switching to other modes are disproportionately likely to be natives, and if changing mode choice is associated with significant changes in location choice.
With interaction terms included, year effects now indicate the time pattern of segregation in metropolitan areas with extremely small levels of public transit ridership. The negative and significant 1990 and 2000 year effects imply that immigrant segregation actually decreased in these areas after 1970. The observed increases in segregation after 1970 occurred primarily in cities with a heavy reliance on transit. This general pattern concords with the urban form hypothesis: in cities where transit has never been a viable option, immigrant clustering should be persistently high. In cities where the viability of transit has declined-that is, in almost every city that had a strong transit grid a generation agoimmigrant segregation has increased.
The remaining regression results reported in table 5 repeat the first set of specifications, using the isolation index in place of dissimilarity. The exact same set of patterns emerges in this case. Introducing the main effect of public transportation usage actually switches the sign of the 1990 and 2000 year effects, and reduces the logarithm of population coefficient substantially. Adding interactions between public transit use and the year effects reveals that transit became an increasingly segregating force over time, and that immigrant segregation tended to fall in metropolitan areas with very little transit usage.
As an illustration of the impact of declining public transit use on immigrant segregation in areas where transit remains a viable commuting choice, figures 8 and 9 present a contrasting study based on data from the 2000 Census. Each figure is a scatterplot, where the unit of observation is a Census tract and the variables being related are the percent foreign born in the tract and the percent of workers in that tract who commute to work using public transit. Figure 8 shows the plot using data on tracts in the New York City Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, while figure 9 plots the tracts in the Los Angeles Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area. While the instinctual reaction might be to label the first area as transit-friendly and the second as transitunfriendly, it should be noted that both metro areas rank in the top fifteen nationwide in terms of the share of commuters using transit. 20 In both areas, there is a pronounced tendency for immigrantdense tracts to also be transit-dense tracts. The difference between the two areas is striking, however. In New York City, there is an abundance of transit-dense neighborhoods, and many have a relatively small share of immigrants. Neighborhoods where few commuters use transit tend to be populated primarily by natives. In Los Angeles, there are only a handful of tracts where transit's market share exceeds 50%, and each of these tracts is also majority-immigrant. If we consider America's large cities to have trended in the direction from New York to Los Angeles over the past half-century, the tendency for immigrant segregation to increase seems a logical outgrowth.
In metropolitan areas where transit has never truly been a viable commuting choice, such as Houston and Tampa, we observe no tendency for immigrants to cluster in tracts served by public transit. In Houston, for example, transit market share never exceeds one-third in any tract. Only 8% of foreign-born residents of the Houston Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area live in a majority-immigrant neighborhood, compared with 32% in the Los Angeles PMSA. These anecdotes support the hypothesis that public transit, where available, served as a focal point for immigrant location choices in the late twentieth century, but not for natives. 21 In summary, our analyses of longitudinal variation in immigrant segregation shows that some portion of the increase in immigrant segregation in the latter half of the twentieth century can be attributed to increasing cultural and racial differences between immigrant groups and the native population. Roughly two-thirds of the increase since 1970 can be attributed to these factors. The remaining third of the post-1970 change, and perhaps a larger share of the pre-1970 change, appears to relate to changes in urban form.
V. Evidence on Housing Prices
Evidence that cultural and racial differences between immigrants and natives have promoted segregation is consistent with two of our hypotheses. In economic terms, these differences may increase immigrants' demand for colocation with other immigrants, or reduce natives' demand for colocation with immigrants. To distinguish between these explanations, we now examine the relationship between immigrant segregation and housing prices.
A desire for exposure to one's own culture, or for access to networks that ease the process of assimilation, should lead immigrants to pay a premium for housing in segregated neighborhoods. Immigrants might also pay a premium if natives take collective action to restrict their housing market choice; in earlier work (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999) we find evidence of such action directed against blacks in the earlier twentieth century. More decentralized nativism may lead to a situation where housing trades at discounted prices in immigrant enclaves, and commands a premium in established native neighborhoods. Such a pattern might also be observed if immigrants tend to congregate in neighborhoods that have fallen into disregard among natives for reasons other than ethnic composition.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, a simple examination of housing price premia does not necessarily distinguish between discrimination and cultural explanations for increased segregation. To distinguish between the hypotheses, we follow our earlier work (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999) and examine the differences in housing premia paid by new and established immigrants, under the assumption that demand for enclave residence is strongest among new migrants, while xenophobia does not discriminate between recent arrivals and others. We also test whether the relationship between segregation and housing prices differs for immigrant groups that differ racially from the native majority. Finally, we estimate specifications using data from two IPUMS samples, to enable inference regarding the possible contribution these factors make to the increase in immigrant segregation over time. A representative equation is thus
where p is the price individual z, belonging to country-oforigin group i, pays for house h in metropolitan area j at time t. The equation includes metropolitan area and countryof-origin fixed effects, group i's share of the population in city j at time t, f ijt , the group's segregation in city j at time ts ijt , a vector of housing unit characteristics X h , a binary indicator for whether an immigrant arrived in the country in the last five years r zijt , and an interaction term between that variable and the segregation index. Native-born individuals are included in each specification, with s ijt , f ijt , and r zjit set equal to 0. The inclusion of natives improves the efficiency of estimates and leads us to interpret the coefficients ␥ 1 , ␥ 2 , ␥ 4 , and ␥ 5 as the impact of the relevant variables on the premium that immigrants pay relative to natives in a metropolitan area.
The results in table 6A utilize the logarithm of rent as a dependent variable. The unit of observation is a renteroccupied housing unit in any metropolitan area in either 1970 or 2000. 22 Each regression controls for a set of metropolitan area fixed effects, country-of-origin fixed effects, and housing structural characteristics, implying that the impact of segregation on rents is identified by comparing the segregation levels of ethnic groups, relative to their national average, within cities. 23 In 1970, we find consistent evidence that immigrants paid a premium for housing in segregated areas. A 1 percentage point increase in dissimilarity is associated with a 0.7% increase in rent paid by immigrants, controlling for housing quality measures and metro area fixed effects. A percentage point increase in isolation predicts a 1.8 percentage point increase in rents. In the isolation regressions, immigrant group share of the population appears as a significant negative predictor of rent. This result probably relates to the 22 Alternative regression specifications estimated using 1990 Census microdata produce results qualitatively similar to those obtained with 2000 data. 23 Note that the inclusion of country-of-origin fixed effects precludes the need to independently control for whether a householder is an immigrant. strong positive relationship between group share and isolation, shown in table 3B above. Thus, increases in isolation associated with higher group share do not predict higher housing rents, while increases orthogonal to variation in group share do. As detailed above, this evidence is consistent either with a decentralized market outcome where immigrants are willing to pay a premium to reside in enclave neighborhoods, or with a market featuring artificial barriers to immigrant mobility. To distinguish between these explanations, the second and fourth regressions add controls for whether an immigrant householder arrived in the United States within the past five years, and interacts that indicator with segregation. Recent immigrants tend to pay higher rent overall, but the recent immigrant premium is consistently estimated to be highest when groups experience the least amount of segregation. The evidence is thus more consistent with barriers to residential mobility among immigrants, although demand for enclave residence that increases with time spent in the United States could also explain this result.
Identical specifications estimated using 2000 IPUMS data produce noticeably different results. The estimated impact of dissimilarity or isolation on rents continues to be positive, but is never more than one-tenth the magnitude of the 1970 specification. Recent immigrants continue to pay a premium for housing, but evidence of a relationship between this premium and segregation is quite weak. In a period of rapidly rising immigrant segregation, the premium immigrants paid for rental housing in segregated cities largely disappeared. Table 6B shifts attention to owner-occupiers, analyzing variation in self-reported estimates of housing value. In general, the results here replicate the analysis of rent values. Estimates suggest that immigrant owner-occupiers' housing values increased with their group's segregation in 1970. The estimated effects are smaller in magnitude than in the corresponding rent regressions, and fail to attain statistical significance in the case of the isolation index. There is no indication that the value of homes owned by recent immigrants bears any special relationship to segregation.
In 2000, there is statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship between dissimilarity and housing values, but once again the coefficient is one-tenth the magnitude of the equivalent 1970 model. Point estimates for isolation are actually negative and insignificant. Further evidence suggests that recently arrived immigrants actually pay a significant discount for owner-occupied housing when their group experiences greater segregation. This is consistent either with a pattern of nativism directed predominantly at newly arrived immigrants, or with a tendency for immigrants to purchase housing in neighborhoods where demand is low for reasons other than ethnic composition. It is possible, for example, that the value native households associate with neighborhood access to public transportation has declined over time. Table 7 tests the nativism hypothesis, under the presumption that anti-immigrant sentiment is particularly strong when directed at immigrants with racial backgrounds differing from the majority. The four regressions in this table judge whether immigrants originating in African, Caribbean, or Latin American countries are subject to a greater discount for housing in segregated areas. Such a pattern would be consistent with our earlier finding (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999 ) of a discount in housing prices paid by blacks in segregated cities. Table 7 reveals a small amount of evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Of the twelve displayed interaction terms, exactly one-the interaction of dissimilarity and Caribbean country of origin-is statistically significant and negative. Two other significant interaction terms suggest the reverse of the hypothesis being tested-that immigrants belonging to these minority groups pay a rent premium in metro areas where their group is isolated from the majority.
While not entirely unsupportive of the decentralized nativism hypothesis, this evidence points more clearly to immigrant occupation of less-desirable neighborhoods as a 1970, 1980, and 1990 . The hypothetical dissimilarity indices measure the fraction of the immigrant population that would have to switch neighborhoods to identically match the distribution of natives in one of these earlier Census years. If immigrants disproportionately inhabit neighborhoods that have fallen out of favor among natives, then the dissimilarity between immigrants and the native distribution in earlier Census enumerations should fall below the actual 2000 immigrant-native dissimilarity index. If, on the other hand, immigrants move to newly created neighborhoods at rates similar to those of natives, then suburbanization trends over the past three decades should render current dissimilarity substantially lower than the hypothetical indices. Figure 10 presents the results of this analysis, classifying metropolitan areas according to whether the distribution of immigrants in 2000 most closely matches the distribution of natives in 1970, 1980, 1990, or 2000 . As the figure illustrates, there is some degree of heterogeneity across metro areas, but the most common tendency is for immigrants to occupy neighborhoods more closely associated with past native residence than current native residence. This tendency is most pronounced in the nation's two largest immigrant destinations, New York and Los Angeles, where the current distribution of the immigrant population most closely resembles the 1970 native population. Among the nation's top ten destinations for immigrants, displayed in figure 10, only in San Diego, Washington, and Miami does the current distribution of immigrants across neighborhoods most closely resemble the current distribution of natives. In most areas, immigrant enclaves have appeared in the wake of natives' drive toward the suburban fringe.
VI. Conclusions
This paper has documented the time series path of segregation for immigrant groups in the United States between 1910 and 2000. These patterns closely track immigration flows to the United States, first declining and then rising after the century's midpoint. Recent increases in immigrant segregation are remarkable for several reasons, not least of which is the fact that they run counter to current trends in racial segregation in American metropolitan areas.
The rise in immigrant segregation appears related to several factors. Since 1970, much of the increase in segregation can be atttributed to cultural factors. Newer immigrant groups have relatively low socioeconomic status and have spent fewer years in the United States. Groups from African or Caribbean nations are more likely to be racially dissimilar from the American majority. Greater linguistic differences between immigrants' native tongues and English has created a greater demand for enclave communities that offer opportunities to reduce communication costs. These factors explain much less of the pre-1970 increase in immigrant segregation.
Evidence also points to automobile-dependent suburbanization as a segregating force over this time period. Immigrant segregation is more positively associated with public transit usage than it once was; metropolitan areas with little reliance on transit actually witnessed decreases in regressionadjusted segregation over the last three decades of the century. Where transit is a viable transportation alternative, immigrants appear to rely on it much more than the native population. Finally, while we have no direct evidence on the time pattern of nativist or xenophobic sentiment, we note that the increase in immigrant segregation after 1970 was accompanied by the disappearance of premiums paid by immigrants for housing in segregated communities. This pattern could be explained either by increasing nativism, or by exogenously decreasing tastes for housing in neighborhoods receiving immigrant inflows.
Will immigrant segregation continue its ascent in the twenty-first century? If so, will America's ability to assimilate new generations of immigrants suffer? The empirical analysis presented here suggests that future trends in segregation will be determined by the interplay of many forces. The further decentralization of American cities and the continued shift of immigration flows away from Europe and toward nations with starker linguistic and racial differences from the American majority point toward increased dissimilarity, particularly for smaller immigrant communities. As immigrant communities grow, however, and as economic convergence continues, the pressures leading to higher segregation levels may be eased, as was evident at least to some extent in the 1990s. Further analysis of the consequences of immigrant isolation, in terms of socioeconomic advancement and cultural assimilation, seems quite prudent in light of these trends.
In this appendix we use restricted-access Census microdata to assess the impact of data restrictions that render us unable to distinguish between immigrants that share neighborhoods with native-born households and those that merely share households with their native-born children. We also report on the impact of redefining segregation measures to exclude immigrants from other countries from the definition of "nongroup" members in equations (1) and (2). Restricted-access microdata, which enable us to observe living arrangements and tract-level geographic identification for a one-in-six sample of U.S. households, permit the computation of a series of alternative dissimilarity and isolation indices for each immigrant community in our sample.
The first set of alternative indices measures the segregation of immigrant group members from native-born individuals. These indices, denoted D N and I N for dissimilarity and isolation, will be higher than the original versions to the extent that immigrant groups locate near one another in cities. The second set of alternative indices measures the segregation of immigrant group members from a subset of natives: those living in households where no immigrants live. These indices will be denoted D NOH and I NOH for dissimilarity and isolation, with the NOH standing for "native-only households." Natives disqualified from this more restrictive definition will consist largely of immigrants' own nativeborn children and other native-born housemates.
Appendix table A1 presents summary statistics and correlations for the original dissimilarity and isolation indices computed with 1990 public-use summary data, as well as a substitute version computed with the restrictedaccess microdata and the two alternative indices described above. In theory, the original indices based on public-use data and restricted-access microdata should be identical, since the latter is the sole source of the former. As table A1 shows, however, the two indices differ slightly in means and are imperfectly correlated, albeit at the 98% level or better. Divergences between the two indices can be attributed to Census imputation and weighting procedures, which influence the public-use summary data but have not been applied to the restricted-access microdata. 24 The two alternative indices are also highly yet imperfectly correlated with the indices that follow the original definition. The impact of changing definitions on measured dissimilarity is generally quite small; comparing indices based on restricted-access data reveal that D NOH is correlated at 0.993 with the original version of the index. Figure A1 shows this relationship graphically. Among the roughly 2,000 points shown in this scatterplot, only a few dozen can be identified at any significant distance from the 45-degree line. It should be noted, however, that the mass of data points shown on the graph is clustered slightly above the 45-degree line, suggesting that immigrant childbearing has a consistent but small depressing effect on dissimilarity measures. The weighted-mean difference between the original dissimilarity index and D NOH , using weights equal to the number of immigrants in the group, is 0.027. A bivariate regression reveals that the slope coefficient in this relationship is not distinguishable from 1, but the intercept term is significantly greater than 0. 25 Correlation coefficients between isolation indices computed with different formulae are somewhat lower. The correlation between the restrictedaccess data-based index using the original formula and I NOH is 0.945. Figure A2 shows this relationship graphically. Virtually every data point in this plot lies above the 45-degree line, and the divergence from this line increases from left to right. The implication of this graph is that immigrant childbearing produces a noticeable decline in isolation levels, particularly among those groups experiencing high levels of isolation. A regression line plotted to fit the data in figure A2 would feature an intercept term indistinguishable from 0 and a slope coefficient of roughly 1.6. This suggests that immigrants' tendency to share households with their own children and other natives leads to a significant understatement of isolation levels among the most segregated groups. 26 The weighted-mean difference between the original isolation index and I NOH is 0.052. The average isolation of immigrants from households containing only natives is almost twice as high as immigrant isolation from all other individuals.
Unfortunately, the data required to perform this exercise are not available for earlier years. We can, however, use our 1990 results to speculate about what alternative index values would have been in earlier 24 As noted previously, our 2000 segregation indices are constructed with restricted-access Census microdata. On the basis of evidence in table A1, we expect these indices to be strongly, though not perfectly, correlated with indices that would have been obtained from public-use data. 25 Some part of this relationship can be attributed to the fact that the original definition of the dissimilarity index masks situations where immigrants share neighborhoods with immigrants of different national origin groups. Regressions of the immigrants-versus-natives index on the original version, and of the immigrants-versus-natives-in-native-onlyhouseholds index on the immigrants-versus-natives index reveals that no more than 20% of the divergence shown in figure A1 can be attributed to immigrant group colocation. 26 Further regression decomposition reveals that about one-third of this 60% understatement can be attributed to the tendency for immigrant groups to colocate. The majority of the effect can be attributed to immigrant childbearing. 27 We then make out-of-sample predictions based on immigrant data from earlier years. The results of this exercise suggest that the most severe childbearing bias in immigrant segregation indices occurs in periods of time when measured segregation levels are high: the early and late parts of the twentieth century. Thus, concerns that the dip in immigrant segregation can be attributed to childbearing bias are unfounded-in fact, our rough attempt to eliminate childbearing bias suggests that the long-term dynamics in immigrant segregation are even more extreme than they appear. 27 These characteristics include immigrant group size, mean immigrant age, and mean immigrant occupation score. Observations in this regression are weighted by the sample size used to compute the immigrant group/year/cityspecific characteristics. The regressions reveal that larger immigrant groups tend to have higher gaps between original and alternative indices, and that higher SES groups (as measured by the occupation score) have higher gaps between original and alternative dissimilarity indices. 
